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Abstract
In 1992, in an effort to end the Sudanese civil war, President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria offered to sponsor
peace talks between the Sudanese government (dominated by the National Islamic Front), and the southern-
based Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Held in the Nigerian capital of Abuja in 1992 and 1993,
the talks ultimately ended in failure, allowing one of the world's long est and deadliest conflicts to continue
unabated. Battle for Peace in Sudan is a fascinating study of these negotiations, written by Wondu, who served
as official notetaker of the SPLM delegation, and Lesch, a political scientist and Sudan specialist. The book
should be required reading for anyone interested in the religious dynamics of the second Sudanese civil war,
the start of which, in 1983, coincided with the regime's introduction of Shari'a hudud laws. This assertion of
Islamic law, which grew stronger after 1989, antagonized the predominantly non-Muslim southern Sudanese
population, and added to longstanding grievances about the country's grossly unequal regional distribution of
political power and wealth.
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Battle for Peace in Sudan: An Analysis of the Abuja Conferences, 1992 
1993, by Steven Wondu and Ann Lesch. 247 pages, index, maps, photographs, 
appendices. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000. $52.50 (Cloth) ISBN 
0-7618-1516-3 
In 1992, in an effort to end the Sudanese civil war, President Ibrahim Babangida 
of Nigeria offered to sponsor peace talks between the Sudanese government 
(dominated by the National Islamic Front), and the southern-based Sudan Peo 
ple's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Held in the Nigerian capital of Abuja in 1992 
and 1993, the talks ultimately ended in failure, allowing one of the world's long 
est and deadliest conflicts to continue unabated. Battle for Peace in Sudan is a 
fascinating study of these negotiations, written by Wondu, who served as official 
notetaker of the SPLM delegation, and Lesch, a political scientist and Sudan spe 
cialist. The book should be required reading for anyone interested in the religious 
dynamics of the second Sudanese civil war, the start of which, in 1983, coincided 
with the regime's introduction of Shari'a hudud laws. This assertion of Islamic 
law, which grew stronger after 1989, antagonized the predominantly non-Muslim 
southern Sudanese population, and added to longstanding grievances about the 
country's grossly unequal regional distribution of political power and wealth. 
At Abuja, disagreements over religion and state thwarted conflict resolu 
tion. Sudan government delegates insisted that the country was and had to be 
an Islamic Arabophone state, since Islam was the majority religion (70 percent) 
and Arabic the plurality language (40 percent). SPLM delegates maintained, on 
the contrary, that the Sudan had to be a secular, multicultural state if it were to 
survive within extant borders, and protested the agenda of successive postcolo 
nial, northern-dominated regimes to propagate Arabic and Islam. 
The SPLM came to Abuja in 1992 weakened by a schism over the viability 
and desirability of unity or secession. Whereas its mainstream branch accepted, 
in theory, the continuation of the unitary territorial state, provided that the gov 
ernment affirmed a commitment to secularism as well as to regional power 
sharing, a splinter group insisted that differences with the regime were irrecon 
cilable and that a North-South divorce should occur. 
The Nigerian conference hosts thought that their country had lessons to 
offer. Like Sudan, Nigeria had struggled after independence to overcome poten 
tial northern-southern, Muslim-Christian divisions, and had even fought a civil 
war, the Biafran War (1967-70). After Biafra, Nigerian leaders sought to reunite 
the country by redrawing internal boundaries, devolving greater authority upon 
smaller regional states, and devising power-sharing mechanisms within the army 
and central government. Significantly, they also declared Nigeria a secular state: 
no religious group would dominate. At Abuja, SPLM delegates welcomed sugges 
tions to model a post-war Sudan on the Nigerian model, but Sudan government 
delegates rejected the model outright. 
Since independence, the Sudan government has had something of a co 
lonial relationship to its southern regions. It has promoted a 'civilizing mission' 
based on Arabic and Islam, and, like a textbook Marxist-Leninist example of im 
perialist predation, has tried to extract southern natural resources—above all wa 
ter, and now, increasingly, oil—to benefit Khartoum. Not surprisingly, where so 
much wealth and culture is at stake, none of the warring parties has yielded. 
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Since 1983, therefore, Sudanese (overwhelmingly southerners) have died in the 
hundreds of thousands. Like many other attempted peace initiatives, the Abuja 
talks failed to end the war. Battle for Peace in Sudan helps to explain why, by 
illuminating the profound ideological rifts that have made the conflict so intracta 
ble. 
Heather J. Sharkey 
Trinity College 
Economics 
The Economy of Iran: The Dilemmas of an Islamic State, edited by Parvin 
Alizadeh. 303 pages, bibliography, index. New York, NY: I. B. Tauris, 2001. 
$65.00 (Cloth) ISBN 1-86064-464-3 
The Economy of Iran is a collection of eight papers on the economic develop 
ment in Iran since the Islamic Revolution. It is a welcome addition to the litera 
ture on the Iranian economy, particularly because economics research on Iran 
remains notably limited. All three papers in part one make an attempt to explain 
the rise and decline of growth in the early 1990s. They show that during 1989 
91, increased oil revenues and economic liberalization, which permitted large 
foreign borrowing, helped the economy recover from the macroeconomic difficul 
ties that it had experienced in the 1980s as a result of the Revolution and war. 
The three papers further agree that the growth episode was short-lived and 
ended in a major balance-of-payments crisis after 1993 because of poor macro 
economic policies. The first two papers—one authored by Hassan Hakimian and 
Massoud Karshenas and the other by Hashem Pesaran—emphasize the role of 
special interests and the incompetence of policymakers in the government's fail 
ure to pursue more effective policies. In contrast, the third paper, authored by 
Sohrab Behdad, suggests that the policy choices were the consequences of the 
revolutionary politicians' preference for politically expedient tactics and the 
prevalence of populist ideologies among them. The difference between the two 
approaches is significant because the analyses of the first two papers imply that 
better policies will come about when the powers of special interests are curbed 
and policymaking take better advantage of expertise. In contrast, Behdad con 
cludes that economic policies in Iran will not be conducive to growth as long as 
the political leaders lack a coherent vision of their regime and fail to establish a 
'pax Islamicus' in ways that the Umayyad and Abbasids did after the revolution 
ary rise of Islam thirteen centuries ago. These three papers offer important in 
formation and assessments, but also suffer from weaknesses. For example, 
Pesaran's paper has an econometric section which is rather preliminary and not 
as good as his usual first-rate work. Another example is a discussion in Behdad's 
paper on foreign exchange policy, which contradicts itself. 
In part two, Suzanne Maloney provides a well-researched account of the 
Islamic Foundations (Bonyads), which are large public business conglomerates 
under the control of the Supreme Leader, independent from the government,, 
and also important agents of rent redistribution with political agendas and strong 
connections. Maloney shows that Bonyack play complex roles in the economy, 
